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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH 
V. J. LUND, WILLARD E. KNIBBEE, 
ERNIE A. POULSEN and EVAN W. 
HANSEN, representing a Class of Persons 
residing and owning real property in Cot-
tonwood Heights, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
COTTONWOOD MEADOWS COMPANY, a 
partnership consisting of W. ALLEN PEL-
TON, and Others unknown, also SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision 
of the State of Utah, and PERSYL RICH-
ARDSON, Director of the Salt Lake Count-
ty Building and Zoning Inspection Dept., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIE~., OF RESPONDENTS 
SALTLAKECOUNTYAND 
PERSYL RICHARDSON 
Case No. 
10015 
STATE~IENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
These respondents adopt appellants' Statement of 
the Nature of the Case. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
These respondents adopt appellants' Disposition 
of the Lower Court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
These respondents are seeking affirmance of the 
judgment granted by the Third District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, lJtah, awarding summary judg-
ment in favor of all Defendants-Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
These respondents adopt the Statement of Material 
Facts previously set forth by respondent Cottonwood 
Meadows Company. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
FINDING THAT APPELLANTS FAILED 
TO EXHAUST THEIR A.DMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDY. 
The building permit in question was issued and 
delivered to respondent Cottonwood Meadows Com-
pany on September 10, 1962. This lawsuit was com-
menced in the District Court on February 21, 1963, 
some five months and eleven days following issuance 
of the building permit. No appeal to the Salt Lake 
County Board of Adjustment or any other administra-
tive board was filed at any time by any of the appellants. 
Appellants, in their argument under Point I of 
their brief, rely strongly on four arguments to "excuse" 
them from following administrative review procedure 
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established by and pursuant to the Statutes of the State 
of l'tah: 
I. . \ ppeal to the Salt Lake County Board of Ad-
justment would ha Ye been fruitless for the reason that 
said Board lacked the "power" to provide any relief; 
:!. Bringing of the ad1ninistrative review was per-
missive only and not mandatory; 
:L The Statutes provide appellants with alternate 
rcme{lits. either administrative or judicial; and, 
4. A.ppellants are not "persons aggrieved" as in-
tended by the Statutes. 
\ \' ith each of these contentions, these respondents 
take issue. 
1. The pertinent portions of 17-27-16 U.C.A. 1953 
han· been set forth and variously emphasized in briefs 
of appellants and the other respondent. Nothing would 
he gained by duplicating them at this time. Accordingly, 
these respondents adopt both the content and the em-
phasis which has been added by both briefs. However, 
these respondents neither adopt nor agree with the con-
tention set forth on page 6 of appellants' brief that 
review in this case would have been fruitless because 
the adn1inistratiYe body would be powerless to afford 
relief." 
The uniform Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake 
County (Title 8, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, 1953) devotes all of Chapter 5 to the 
establishment, duties and powers of the Board of Adjust-
ment and proYides, in part: 
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"8-5-2. DUTIES AND POWERS OF 
BOARD. 
" (a) It shall be the duty of such Board to hear 
all appeals taken by any person aggrieved or by 
any officer, department, board or bureau of the 
County affected by any decision of the officer in 
charge of the administration of this Title ... 
''(b) In addition to any other powers given by 
State Law or County Ordinance, the Board, 
after proper notice and public hearing, shall have 
the following powers: 
" ... ( 3) Interpretation. 
"(a) The Board may interpret the Zoning 
Map and the Zoning Ordinance. 
"(b) The Board may hear and decide appeals 
where it is alleged by the appellant that there 
is error in any order, requirement, decision or 
refusal made in the enforcement of this Ordi-
nance.'' 
At first blush, the contention of appellants that the 
Board of Adjustment lacked "power" to afford them 
any relief would appear absurd. On a closer examina-
tion, this contention is bared of all semblance of logic. 
Certainly the act of respondent Persyl Richardson 
in issuing the building permit in question was a "decision 
of the officer in charge of the administration of this 
Title" for respondent Richardson is that officer as desig-
nated by the ordinance itself. Certainly the Board had 
the "power" to interpret the Zoning Map and the Zon-
ing Ordinance, and that is all that was in question. The 
question was not, as appellants would attempt to stress 
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un page ti of their brief, whether or not an ordinance 
"is arbitrary or unreasonable or ... invalid." 
i'-ml, certainly appellants are alleging that there 
was "error in (an) order, require1nent, decision or 
rd'usal in the enforcement of this Ordinance." The cmn-
plaint in this lawsuit makes that allegation clear and 
part of the relief sought in the trial court was to have 
the action of respondent Richardson in issuing the build-
ing perrnit declared in error, void, and invalid. 
This "excuse" on the part of appellants for not 
exhausting their administrative remedies lack substan-
tiation. 
:2. Appellants next dwell, on page 7 of their brief, 
on what they claim is the "permissive" nature of the 
words used in Sec. 17-27-16. 
This point, these respondents feel, is fairly and 
adequately covered in the brief filed on behalf of respon-
dent Cottonwood Meadows Cmnpany and these respon-
dents, accordingly, adopt the arguments therein con-
tained. In addition, it is of interest that appellants are 
before the Supreme Court by virtue of the authority of 
Rule 73 (a) U.R.C.P. 
That rule states, as does Sec. 17-27-16, that an 
appeal "may" be taken. These respondents submit that 
a fair interpretation of Rule 73 (a) is that in the event 
an appeal is taken then it l\iUST be taken in the follow-
ing 1nanner and within the following time. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
By using the permissive "may" in Rule 73 (a) 
neither the Legislature nor the Supreme Court have 
provided any means by which an unsuccessful litigant 
can receive review other than by following the procedure 
of that Rule. 
Both appellants and respondent Cottonwood Mea-
dows Company have cited, with obvious favor, the Utah 
case of Provo City v. Claudin, 73 P2d 570. These respon-
dents, therefore, add a lustre of unanimity to one portion 
of this litigation by likewise relying on this earlier pro-
nouncement by this Honorable Court. 
These respondents submit that the Utah Supreme 
Court in the Claudin case has laid to rest the question 
of whether or not administrative remedies must be ex-
hausted in zoning cases. At page 575, the Court said: 
''The court need not consider such matters in 
issue until they have been tried administratively, 
especially where there are channels from admin-
istrative rulings to the courts. . . . " 
These respondents vigorously question that the 
Claudin case is a source for the pronouncement which 
appellants contend for it on pages 6 and 7 of their brief. 
The Claudin case was interpreting 15-8-89 to 15-8-107 
Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 and particularly Section 
15-8-98, which stated: 
"Appeals to the board of adjustment may be 
taken by any person aggrieved. . . . " 
This language is identical to that of the present 
Section 17-27-16. Interpreting the language of Section 
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t.J-8-m~ Hc' ised Statutes of Utah 1933, this Court an-
nuun<.·ed that adtuinistrative remedies must be exhausted . 
.. \ppdlanls have subtnitted nothing to indicate that the 
Clnudin decision should be overruled. 
The only difficulty this Court had with exhaustion 
of administrative remedies in the Claudin case was the 
fnct that the relief sought was to have an ordinance 
declared "arbitrary and unreasonable" and, hence, in 
violation of Constitutional rights. This Court, and 
rightly so, indicated that only the judiciary and not the 
administrative arm of government can pass upon the 
arbitrariness and unreasonableness and, hence, the Con-
stitutionality of a law. 
:3 • . Appellants would contend that Sections 17-27-16 
and 17-27-23 provide them with "alternative" remedies 
either to proceed administratively or judicially. In doing 
so. appellants would appear to be attempting to impart 
to these sections an inconsistency under any other inter-
pretation. These respondents take issue with this con-
tention . 
.. ..-\.clear and fair interpretation of these two sections 
Is tim t the administrative remedies first must be ex-
hausted and then, if the aggrieved party desires to go 
further, injunction may be sought in addition to mere 
review of the action of the Board of Adjustment. 
Decisions of administrative board of appeal his-
torically are subject to review by the courts through 
certiorari. Certiorari permits review only of errors of law 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
committed by the administrative tribunal and solely 
upon the record before that administrative tribunal. Lee 
v. Board of Adjustment, 226 NC 107, 37 SE2d 128; 
Inzerelli v. Pitney, 30 NYS 2d 129. This latter case 
adds to this rule that, in the absence of express statutory 
authority for sorr1e other relief of procedure on appeal, 
certiorari is exclusive. 
The Utah Legislature obviously did not think that 
certiorari was sufficient. In enacting Section 17-27-23 
they have permitted injunction to issue from a court of 
competent jurisdiction if all of the other requirements 
of the various statutes have been met. 
A clear and fair interpretation of Section 17-27-16 
and 17-27-23 is that appellants had the right to appeal 
to the Board of Adjustment and, if still dissatisfied, 
could seek further review in the Courts, which review 
would amount to a trial de novo and could include 
issuance of an injunction, if such proved to be an a p-
propriate remedy. 
These Sections provided appellants with an "alter-
native" remedy after they had exhausted their admin-
istrative remedies but not an "alternative" remedy to 
exhaustion of their administrative remedies. 
4. Appellants raise, for the first time on appeal, 
the rather novel question that they are not "persons 
aggrieved." Their argument would appear to make some 
distinction between "persons aggrieved" and "persons 
materially affected." For, if they are not aggrieved then 
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considerable time of both Courts and counsel has been 
expended for naught. 
These respondents submit that, while Section 
17-:.!7·16 does not define "person aggrieved" Section 17-
:.!7 -~:> includes appellants within a class of persons who 
ure entitled to take their grievance beyond the Board of 
Adjustment and into the Courts and, therefore, desig-
nates appellants as a class of "persons aggrieved." 
~lany courts have faced the problem of who is an 
aggrieved person in the matter of zoning decisions. 
One such case is People ex rel. Broadway Co. v. 
\\'alsh, 196 NYS 672, affirmed in 203 App Div 468, 
wherein the New York Court held: 
"The relator, which was a taxpayer in the city 
of New York is a person aggrieved within the 
1neaning of subdivision 2 of Section 719 of the 
Greater New York charter providing that an 
appeal may be taken by any person aggrieved 
from an order, requirement, decision or determi-
nation made by the superintendent of buildings. 
"The relator having failed to exhaust its re-
medy by appeal to the board of appeals, is not 
in a position to apply to the court for relief by 
way of mandamus to compel the superintendent 
of buildings to cancel and revoke the permit, and 
its n1otion for a final order was properly denied." 
\T ariously, other courts have held the following 
classes of persons to be what is denominated in Utah 
statutes as a "person aggrieved": 
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A person who owned improved real property in the 
same section of the City (of Schenectady) , see Rice v. 
Van Vranker, 232 NYS 506,225 App Div 179, affirmed 
in 255 NY 541, 170 NE 126; a lessee, see Ralston 
Purina Company v. Zoning Board, 64 RI 197, 12 A2d 
219; any landowner or resident within the city, adversely 
affected, see Kamerman v. Leroy, 133 Conn 232,50 A2d 
175; mere taxpayers of the city (of Baltimore) even 
though they did not live in the neighborhood involved 
and no near neighbors objected, see Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore v. Byrd, 191 Md 632, 62 At12d 
588. 
Certainly the courts have expanded the definition 
of "person aggrieved" beyond that advanced by appel-
lants in quoting from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. 
Where legislative guidelines have been provided, as Utah 
has done in enacting Section 17-27-23 to afford relief 
for any person owning property in the same zoned dis-
trict those guidelines should not be disregarded in inter-
preting and defining "person aggrieved" as used in 
Section 17-27-16. 
Short "appeal periods" are essential in acts of zon-
ing boards and administrators, just as they are in 
judicial review of judgments and final orders of an 
inferior tribunal. A judgment or final order of a court 
must have stability- an aura of definiteness- if judi-
cial decrees are to have integrity upon which those 
affected thereby may exhibit reliance. 
So must it be with acts and decisions of zoning 
boards and administrators. 
10 
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. \ zoning board or administrator makes a decision, 
pnforn1s an act. That act always affects valuable rights 
itt rl'al property. Everyone is not always pleased by the 
dec: is ion; some are aggrieved. However, in each instance 
someone is going to gamble a valuable real property 
right on that decision or act. In order that those whose 
rights are affected by the decision or act may rely upon 
the finality, stability and integrity of that decision or 
act appeal rights must be stilled early. 
Hence, the Legislature of the State of Utah has 
seen fit to provide for administrative review through 
boards of adjustment and permitted each county of the 
State to provide the time within which such review must 
be sought by appeal, properly entrusting to the boards 
of county commissioners of the various counties the 
responsibility of determining what best suits the general 
welfare of their particular citizens. 
Acting under this authority and responsibility, Salt 
Lake County has provided that such an appeal must be 
taken within 90 days. The reasonableness of that short 
appeal period has not been questioned by appellants. 
Hence, we can but assume that they agree that it is a 
reasonable length of time. 
James :\Ietzenbaum, in his learned, three-volume 
work on zoning ( Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning) 
devotes Chapter IX-e to problems of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. At Chapter IX-e- (2) the author 
say~. at Yolwne 1. page 712: 
11 
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"The general rule is that a complainant attack-
ing the constitutionality or unreasonableness of 
specific provisions of a zoning ordinance as it 
applies to a particular property, must exhaust 
the available administrative remedies before re-
sorting to court. 
"This rule applies whether such attacking 
actions are brought by way of lVIandamus 
or by Injunction or by Declaratory Judgment 
proceedings. It has been upheld in most states 
and by the Federal courts. 
"This rule is supported not only by the pre-
ponderance of court decisions but, also, by logic 
and reason: 
"In each state, there are many thousands of 
buildings and many thousands of parcels of land. 
"If each plaintiff were permitted to engage 
the courts with proceedings attacking the consti-
tutionality or the unconstitutional-unreasonable-
ness of each zoning ordinance as it applies to such 
complainant's own property, without first seek-
ing relief by the available administrative reme-
dies, would not the courts of every state be 
clogged with such actions virtually to the exclu-
sion of other matters? 
"Would there not be so great a flood of such 
proceedings as to overwhelm the courts?" 
Again, at Volume 1, page 717, the author says: 
"This rule applies in 'injunction' and 'declara-
tory' actions. 
"Not only reason but the array of court pro-
nouncements in Injunction and Declaratory 
1~ 
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J udg1nent proceedings also testify to this broadly 
imbedded rule, and that, too, where constitution-
ality of such specific provisions was in issue." 
The author then virtually spans the nation with 
rtported cases from California to New York, including 
therein the Claudin case heretofore cited. 
CONCLUSION 
.Appellants have failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies which were provided them both by statute anrl 
by ordinance. They have slept on their rights. They 
should not now be heard to complain of the acts of others 
who diligently pursued their rights and responsibilities. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
In no event should the relief asked by appellants 
be granted and sunuuary judgment be entered in their 
favor. These respondents find nothing in the record nor 
in appellants' brief to indicate that the refusal of the 
trial judge to grant summary judgment in favor of 
appellants was raised by this appeal. 
If the judgment of the trial court is to be reversed, 
which we respectfully submit it should not, this matter 
should be remanded for determination of all factual 
questions and a trial on the merits. 
13 
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Respectfully submitted, 
OLLIE McCULLOCH 
Chief Deputy 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
513 City-County Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondents 
Salt Lake County and 
Persyl Richardson 
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